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Ab str ac t
I n t h i s pap e r dec i si on m ak ing on publ ic p ens i ons is m o deled within the f ram ew ork of
the w e l l- kno wn t w o- o v erlappi ng-gene rati ons g e ner a l-equil ibrium m o del wi th r a ti onal e xp ec -
tati ons. The m od el i s us ed to analy z e the e ￿ec ts of ag ing on the e v oluti on o f publ ic p e nsio n
sc he m e s. Analyti ca l res ul ts are d eriv ed f or the long run as w ell as f or the s ho rt ru n b y the
m e t h o do fc o m parati v es t a ti c s and com pa ra tiv e dyna m ics re sp e ctiv el y . This s ho ws th a t the
short-run c o ns eque nce s o fa g i n g d epen d cr u ci al ly on the e xi st i ng size of t he P A YG-sc he m e.
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1 In tr o duct ion
In most dev el op ed coun trie s, a su bst an ti a lp a rt of the el derl y’ s i ncome i s p r o vi ded fo rb y means
of p ubl ic p ensi on sc h emes. G en era lly , these p ubl ic p ensi o n plans are ￿nanced b yaP a y-As-
Y ou-Go (or P A YG) sc heme w h ere cu rr en t p ensi on p a ymen ts are ￿n a n ced o ut o f c urren tt ax
pa ymen t s that a re col lec t iv ely dec ide d u p on. These P A YG -sc he mes ha v ed r a wn a g reat d eal
of at ten ti o n recen tl y due to t h e exp ected a gi ng of the p opul at i on and the i ncreasi ng ta xr a tes
thi s mig h te n ta il. It is o fi n t erest t o consi der what shoul d b e the reactions of p oli cy ma k ers
to the de mo graphi c c hanges t hat a re takin g pl ace. Thi s i ssue i s consid ered i n t he f ramew o rk
of a n o v erlapp ing-gen era ti o n s (O LG) gene r al -equi l ib r i um mo del of economic gro wth where a
cen tral plann er with a n i n￿ni te h o ri zon maximi zes a Ben thamite so c ial w e lfare fun ct i on. T ha t
i s, the ce n t ral pl anner maximi zes a d iscoun ted i n￿n ite sum o fw eigh ted a v erage ut i l iti es o f
succ essiv e gene r ations of ￿n itel y li v ed consu mers wh ere the w eigh ts ar e determine d b y the
si ze o f the generat i ons. Our pap er shares the ob jectiv es of p a p ers su c ha sb yP et ers (1 991 )
and Bo v en b erg et a l. ( 1 993) . I n deri vin g short-run e￿ects o f aging i t i s a ssu m ed b yP et ers
(1 991) that t h e cen tra l pl anner do es n o tt a k e the wh o l e future i n t o accoun t. Thi s i s n o t
the case i n Bo v en b erg e t al. ( 199 3). They use an Auerbac h-K o tl ik o￿ ( 1987 )i n tertemp oral
fra me w ork i n d erivi ng g e neral-e quil i briu m resp onses t o aging. Un li k eo ur pa pe r t he y a r en o t
a b l e to giv ea na l ytical solu t i ons for tra n sition pat h s and ha v et o rel y on n umeri cal s im ul a ti o ns .
The e ￿ ec t s of aging i n an O LG-mo del can al so b e c o n trast ed with the e￿ ec t si n t he Ramsey-
mo del ofe c o no mi c gro wt h . A pat h -breakin g and often ci t e d pap er i n this area is Cutle r et
al.( 1 9 9 0). The ma i n assumptions o f the Ramsey-mo del a re that in ￿ni tely- long l i vin g ag en t s
ha v e p erfec t foresi g h t and that the ec o no m y foll o ws a path that m axi mize s di sco un t ed u t i lit y
o v er an i n￿ni te horiz o n. T h e dra wbac ko ft h is str u cture is that in tergenerational red istrib ution
e￿ects of a gi ng c a nn o tb et a k en in to accoun t. The p o in t i s that red istrib ution o n ly ￿ts i n the
Ramsey-framew ork i f t h e pl anni ng probl em fa ci ng t h e g o v ernmen t can b e de co mp osed i n t o
t w o subp ro b lems, a st and a rd pro b lem o fa ggrega te c a p ital a c cum ul a ti o n and a p ro bl em o f
￿
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di st ri buti ng consumpti o no pti ma lly o n eac h dat ea mong the generations al iv e then . Thi s is
not p ossibl e, ho w ev er, i f the si ze of the p opul a ti o ns i z ev a ri es and the go v ernmen tm axi mize s a
Ben thami t e soc ial w e lfare func t i on. Therefore, i n that cas et h e Calv o-Obstfel d resul t t ha t "the
Cas s- Ko opma n s-Ramsey framew ork c a n b e used to ev a l uate paths of aggr eg ate c o ns u mption
ev en in m ode ls w h ere di ￿ er en t gen era ti o n s co-exi st "
1
do es n o t hol d.
The cl os e d-econom y gene r al -equi l ib r iu m f ramew o rk used in thi s pap e r i s presen ted in Se ction
2.I n S e c t io n 3 a c en t ral pl anner is i n tro duc ed t ha t deci des on the all o cation of pro du ction
to consump t io n a nd i n v estmen t , and the di st ri buti o n of consumption b et w een y oung a nd o ld
in d i vid uals, resp.. As i s w el l kno wn suc ha c o mmand optim um can b e rep li cated b y a mark et
econom y accompanie d b yaP A YG -￿ nanced publ i c p ensi o ns c heme.
I n Secti o n4 w ei n v esti g ate ho waP A YG-p ensi o n system react s to the agi ng of t h e p opu lation
whi c hc a n b e e xp ected to o ccu r i n the next cen tury i n mo st c o un t ri es of the W estern w orld .
Agin g can h a v e sev eral e￿ects. First, ev erythi ng el se gi v e n, aging impl i es hi gher c o n trib ution
rat es.T hi s e ￿ ec t has dra wn t h e most a tten tion a n d conc ern exp r es se d e.g. i n p o l i cy ci rcl es
2
.
The p o lic y r ea cti on t he n ma y b e to decrease the b en e￿ts. Secondl y ,a gi ng i mpl ie s that l ess
sa vi ng is nec essa ry to main tain a certain capi ta l- la b or ratio. I n t hi s p a per b o th these e￿ects o f
ag i ng are ta k en in to accoun ta nd it w ill b e d er iv ed u nder what ci r c umst anc es ag in g w i ll l ea dt o
a n in cr ea si ng or a decreasi ng rel a ti v e i mp ort anc e of the P A YG -sc h eme. It sh o u ld b e stressed
that the shor t-run e￿ects c a n di ￿er consi derabl y from the e￿ects i n t h e long ru n. Therefor e, w e
n o t o n ly per form a compara ti v e sta ti cs analysi s i n order t o trace the long-run e￿ects, but w e
also study the short -run consequen ces of agin g .W e deri v ea na l ytical r e sults for the short r un f o r
f a i r ly g e n e r a l sp e ci￿ cat i ons for uti li t ya nd pr o d uction functi o ns b y the metho d o f com pa rativ e
dynami cs. M oro v er, w e d isti nguish b et w een exp ected a n d u nexp e cted sh o c ks . By usi ng an
OL G - m o d el w e ar e abl e to quali fy one o ft h e cen tral r es u lts of Cutl er et al., nam el y t hat an
exp ected aging of t h e p opul at i on wil l l ead to sh o rt-run gains i n consump t i on p ossib il i t i es. It
wil l b e sho w n that thi s r e sult dep end s on the siz e o f the P A YG-sc heme . The same hold s true
for un exp ec t ed c ha ng es i n the rat e of p opul a ti o n gro wth. As a coroll ar yi t i ss h o w n that an
exp ected dec r ea se i n the ra te of p opul at io n g ro wt hm a y l ead to the i n t ro du ction of a pub li c
p ensi o n syst em i n an econom y wh ere suc has c he m e previ o u sly d id not e xist.
The pap er wi nds u p wi t hs o me c o n clu di ng rema rks i n S ection 5.
2 The Mo del
2.1 The Indiv iduals
The analysi s is based on t he w el l- kno wn t w o-o v erl appi ng-generat i ons m o d el whe r e there i s a
la rge n um b er of i ndi vid uals l i vin g fo rt w o p eri o ds and ev er y one i s i den ti ca l e xcept for di ￿ er e nces
in a g e . Si nc e t he y oun g ’s sa vi ngs deci sions are a ssu m ed t o b e d ecen trali zed and u nco ordin a ted ,
eac hy o u ng ind ivi dual t ak es a ggrega te sa vi ngs and the ta x rat ea sg i v en. I t i s as su med t ha t
ev ery i ndi vid ual b orn at ti me t w orks a ￿xed amoun to ft i m ea tw age w
t
duri ng t h e ￿rst p eri o d
of h is l ife. A par t of thi s w ag ei st axed a w a yb y the go v ernmen tb y a lu mp-sum t ax ￿
t
tob e
t r ansferred t o the ol d. The remain der i s used for sa vi ngs for ol d age (s
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Cal v o and O b stfeld (1 988, p.163).
2
Se e, e.g. V a n den No ord and Herd (19 93).3
When old , t h e i ndi vi dual consume s the r et urn on h is sa vi ngs and the transfer pa ymen t ￿ fro m















In di vidu a l s are assumed n o tt ob ea l t ru istic : the y do not car ea b out t he le v els of uti li t yo f
i ndi vid uals b orn in another t im e per iod . I t is a ssu m ed t ha t li fetime uti li t y of an i ndi vid ual












) ; ( 3 )
w h e r e t he fel ici t y functi o n s ob ey t he In a da -c o n diti ons. The p a rameter ￿ in dic a tes the ra te o f





















. Thi s condi t i on sta tes that the y oung use sa vi ngs t o equate t he m a rgi nal
rat e o f substituti o n of consumpti o n i n the ￿rst a n d the second par t of thei r l iv es t o the ra te o f
return on sa ving s
3
.
2.2 The Mark ets
W e cl ose the mo del b y con v en tional equi li bri um condi tions on the fa ctor ma rk ets a nd t h e g ood s
m a r k e t . P r od u ct ion p er w o rk er at time t is de scrib ed b yas t andard ne o classi cal pro du ction
func t io n f ( k
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< 0 ) whe r e k
t
i s t he capi tal-l ab or ratio. Ab s tracting
fro m d epreci at i on and assumi ng tha t￿ r ms act comp eti t iv el y a n d that lab or supp ly i s exogenous



















E q u ili br iu m o n the go o ds ma rk et i mpl ies fo ro u r cl o sed -econom y mo del that i n v es t men tb e
equal to s a vi ng so ri np e rw o rk er terms :





where n i s the r ate of p opul a ti o n gro wt h whi c h i s assumed t o b e d etermine d exogenousl y
4
.


















whi c hs i m p l ys a ys t hat tot al supp ly o fg oods c a n b e a ll oca ted t oi n v estmen to rt oc o ns u mption
b y the c urr en t l y l ivi ng generations.
3
Noti ce tha t an int e rnal sol uti on has b een assu med. Ex clu di ng p erv ers e sol uti ons , the exi stence of suc ha
sol uti on wi ll b e gu aran teed due to the requ ir emen t of eq ui li bri um on t he g oods mark et to b e di scu ssed b elo w.
4
F or exp osati ona l reas ons, w e i ni tia ll y ass ume n to b e con stan t.4
3 De ci si on m ak i ng o n publ i c p ensi ons
The go v ernme n ta t t im e t i s assumed to ma xi miz e a Ben tham it e s oc ia lw elfare fun ct i on with a














; (0 < ￿< 1 ) : (9 )
Accordi ng to eq. (9) the g o v ernmen t is a so c ial pl a n ner who ta k es accoun t of the w el fa re of al l
curren t and future generat i ons w h ere the w elfare o f a generation is measured b y the util i t yo f
a represen tat iv e i ndi vid ual of thi s generat io n w ei g h ted b yt h e si ze of the gene r ation
5
.
Assumi ng t hat n<￿ the ￿rst -order condi tions fo r a comma nd o pt im u m that maximi zes


































) : ( 1 1 )
E q . ( 1 1 ) i s a c o n diti o n for o pt i mal a lloc a ti on b et w een y o un g and ol d al iv ea t the sa me t im e
and eq. ( 12) opti mize s i n tert emp or al al lo c a ti o n . Notic e t ha t com bi ni ng t h ese condi t i ons with
eq. (6) le a d s to the ￿rst -o rde r condi tion fo rs a vi ng (eq. (4) ). So t he ce n t ral pl anner r es pe ct s
t h e i nd i v id ua l’ ss a vi ng deci sion. Thi s i mpl ie s that the com mand optim um can b e rea liz e d in a
mar k et econom yw i t h i n tergenerat i onal red istribu t io n t hr o u g haP A YG-sc he m e
7
.A b s tracting
fro m admi ni st rativ ec o sts the bu dget rest ri ction of thi s sc heme reads:
￿
t
=( 1+ n ) ￿
t
: (12 )




r = ￿: (13 )
Thi s i s the w el l-kn o wn mo di ￿ed go l den rul e: the hi g he r the so ci a l disc o un tf a ct or, t he lo w er
the capi t al sto c k p er w ork er i n the st ea d y stat e wi ll b e, whi c hi s , of course a cc o mp li shed b y
a hi gher transfer whi c hh a s a negativ ee ￿ e c to ns a vings. Not ic e t ha tt he assumption ￿> n
i mpli es that the e conom y i s dynamic a l l y e ￿cie n t i n the steady st ate (r>n ). I n t h e case where
￿ ￿ n the ￿rst-o rd er condi tions ( 11) a n d (12 ) d o not appl y . I t is evid en t that in that cas e the




The c hoi ce f or thi s form of th e w elfare functi on i s moti v ated b y the fact th at wi thout thi s w ei gh ti ng the
pl an ner w oul d rais e the co nsump tio n of mem b ers of sma ll coh orts rel ati v et o t h a to fm e m b ers of l arger cohorts.
F or a di scus sio n on the ad v an tag es of a B en thami te so ci al w el fare functi on se e B lan c het and K e ssle r (1 991).
6
Se e B lan c hard a nd Fi sc her (19 89), s ection 3. 1.
7
It sh oul d furth er b e n oted th at the o ptima l p ol icy i s (stati onary and non - st a tion ary) ti me con si sten t. See
Bern hei m ( 1 989).
8
W hen no ti me sub scri pt is u sed the stead y-state v al ue i s mean t.
9
As t h e g old en rul e i mpl i es tha t total c onsu mptio n p ossi bi l iti es are ma xi mized , an y ti me p ath t ha t doe s n o t
l ead to the go ld en rul e is d omin ated acco rdi ng to the tak e-o ver criteri on by a time pa th that l eads to r = n.5
4 The e ￿ec ts of a gi ng
In thi s section w ec o n side r the e￿ects o fa g in g r e ￿ected b y a d ecrease in p opul a ti o n gro wth
(n). T h e sh o rt-run a sw ell as t h e l ong-run consequen ces o fo n ce-and- f or-all c hanges i n n are
deri v ed a na l ytical ly .
10
. The l o ng -ru n e￿ects fol lo w fro m compar i ng steady st ates, whi le the
short -r u n consequ ence s a re t raced b y compara ti v e dynami cs
1 1
. R ega rdi ng the shor t run , the
e￿ects of unexp ected and exp ected sho c ks c a n b e d isti nguish ed. The anal ys i s l earns t ha t
t h e s h o rt -r un e ￿ e cts of ag i ng can b e (bu t ne ed not b e) o p p osite to the e ￿ ec t si nt h e long
run. E.g ., whi le a c urr en t or future de crease in p opu lation gro wth l eads to losses i n uti li t yi n
t h e l o n g r un in a dynamic a l l y e￿ci en t econom y ,s h o rt-run ga i n si nu t ili t y for y oung a nd o ld
in d iv i d uals are p os si bl e. The reason for this r e sult i s w ell kn o wn, i.e. ag i ng de crea se s t h e future
n e e do fc a p ital w hi c h can i nc ite the so ci a l p lann er to decrease sa vi ngs and t h u s in crease cu r ren t
consumpti on. Ho w ev er , thi s c o ns u mption-sti m ul at in g e ￿ e ct can b e und o ne if t h e P A YG -s ystem
en tail s rel a ti v e ly h igh transfers. It shoul d b e noted a t the outset that t h is l ast e￿ e ct is absen t
i n Ramsey mo de ls.
The comparat iv e statics as w el l as the comparat iv e d ynamics analysi s is based on l i n-
eariz a ti o no f t h e mo del prese n t ed ab o v ea roun d the steady stat e. W e conce n t rat e on the
e￿ects of o n ce-and- fo r-al l dec r ea ses i n p opul at io n g ro w th (n). Le t n
t





d escrib es t h e ti m e patt er n of the p e r turbation of the s teady-stat ev a l ue of the par am-
eter n a n d ￿ the mag n itud e. I t i s assumed that at some t im e t = 0 a sho c k unexp ect-















= ￿￿ ￿ = h< 0) . I t wil l b e con v eni en t i n the seque l












The l in ea ri zed mo de l can then b e co n dense d t o a system descri bin g the c hanges in thi s v ariabl e



























; t = 0; 1;: : :: (15 )
where M i sam a tri x descri bi ng t h e e￿ects o f the c urren t and next-p erio d c ha ng ei nn on the
sta te v ari a b les and J is t he J a co b ian mat ri x (see the App end ix for de t ai ls). As the syst em in
eq. (1 5) is sadd lep oin t sta b le i t can b e so lv ed to ￿nd t he in itial e￿ect o fc ha ng es i n n o nt otal




( s ee Bl anc har d and Kahn ( 1981 )). The ev o l uti o no f c and k can t he n b e
tr ace d b y usi ng the s ame system a gai n. The c ha ng e s i n al l other v ariabl es can b e deri v e d fro m
the c hanges o f these sta te v ariabl es. In p a rtic ular, w e calc ul a te the c hanges i n consump t io n o f
the y oung and t he old a n d the e￿ect on the t ax rat e , resp ectiv el y .
10
Mo st res ul ts can di rectl y b e gen eral ized t o temp orary c h anges i n th ese parameters .
11
Thi s metho d i s des crib ed b y Jud d (1982) for a con ti n u ous-ti me mo del . I t can e asi ly b e general i zed to
di screte time, ho w ev er. S ee Mei jdam and V e rho ev en (199 4), who al so sh o w that t h e ap pro xi mati on of the short-
run e￿ects of a pa rameter c han ge b y th is meth o d i s as rel i abl e as a sta ndard compara tiv e- sta tics a nal ysi s. The
metho d is ex pl ai ned i n the App endi x.6
The s ho r t- r un e￿ ec ts of a n unexp ec ted dec r ease i n n
An un exp e ct e d decrease i n p opul at io n g r o wt h l eads to macro economic e￿ects on t ota l con-
sumpti o nt ha tc a n b e deri v ed b y solvi ng the system i n e q. ( 15) . The e￿ect of t he c hange i n
n on tot al consumption p er w ork er can b e r ea do ￿ fro m eq. ( v) i n the App end ix, whic hi s





= ( 1 + n ) ( ￿
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Not i ce fro m eq. ( 16) t ha tt he optimal resp o nse of tot al consumpti on i s i n p a rt d eterm i ned b y
future c hanges i n the rat eo fp o pu la ti o ng ro w th. T h i si sar e ￿ecti o no f the forw ard-l o oking
b eha vi or of t h e ce n t ral pl a n ner who tak e s accoun to ft h eu t ili t yo fa l l future gen era ti o n s. The
in it ia l m a cr o e cono mi c e￿ect on consumpti o n app ear s to consi st of sev eral el emen ts. Firstly ,
a decre a se i n n causes an u p w ard jump i n the capital- lab or rat i o, whi c h i mpl ies a h igher
pro du ct io n a nd t h u s a highe r consu m pt i on p er w ork er. Thi s i s r e ￿ected b y the ￿rst term i n









> 0). On to p of this, t he e ￿ e ct on i ni t i al consump t i o ni si np a r t
determi ned b ya n tici pation of t h e future e￿ects o f the c hange i n n as re￿ected b y the a p p eara nc e
o f t h e t er m s h
j
( j > 0 ) in e q . ( 1 6 ) . T w o future e ￿ ec t s can b e disc erned. T he ￿r st is t he c apita l
thickeni ng e￿ ec t ( k, see the second term in eq. ( 16))
13
.T h is e￿ect st ems fro m the fact that a
dec r ea se i n n impl i es that a certa in le v el of sa vin g p e r w o rk er ceteris parib us l eads to a h igher
capi t al -l a bo r r a ti o ne xt p eri o d. This i s an t i ci pated b y i mmedi a tel y d ecreasin g the s a vi ng rat e,
so t ha t consumpti o n inc r ea se s .T h e second future e￿ect comes fro m redi str ib ut io n be t w e en the
y o u ng a n d the old . Thi s is caused b yt he c hange in t he s o - call ed de p en denc y r atio de ￿ned as





) imp li es that t otal
consumpti on p er w ork er has to b e shared with a larger n um be r o f p ensi o n ers .A l t ho ugh thi s is
a redi st ri butio ne ￿ ec t it m a y i n￿u ence sa vi ngs a nd t h us to tal c o ns u mption. Of course, i n case
of a n unexp ected d ecrease i n n,t he dep ende ncy-rat io e ￿ e ct not onl y a￿ ec t s future c o ns u mption
bu t i ni t i al consumpti on a sw ell . Ho w ev er, if the c hange in p opul at io n g ro wt hi so n ce-and- f or-
all , so that h
j
= h 8j ￿ 0, then t he in it i al d ep e nden cy-ra ti o e￿ e ct is exact ly co mp ensat ed b y
the future e￿ ec t . Thi s l ea ds t o the fo llo win g lemma:
Lem m a1
In t he c ase of a n une xp e cte do n c e-and-for- al l change in p opu l a tion gr owth, th e change in the
dep enden cy r a tio do es not a￿e ct initial total c ons u mption.
Thi s lemma can b e vi ew ed a sa ne x t e nsi o no ft he resu lt in Cutl er e t al. ( 1990 )t ha ti na
Ramsey mo de l the dep ende ncy rat i o do es n o t i n￿u ence st eady- s tate sa vi ngs.
I t i mmedi at el y foll o w s that t h e i niti a l macro economic e￿ ec t o nt ota l consump t i on i n the case
of a once-and -fo r-al l is s hoc k p osi t iv e. Ho w ev er, ev en t ho ug ht o tal consumption rises ini tial ly ,
old -a ge consu m pt io n a sw el l as y oung-age consumption ma y f a l li nt he s ho rt run if the negativ e
dep end ency-ratio e￿ect i s st rong enough. This app ears fr om the c hange i n c o n sumption of the
y o u ng and t h e ol d resu lti ng fro m b oth macro economic e￿ects and redi st ri buti o n e￿ects whi c h
foll o w from di ￿ eren ti a ti ng eq. (1 1) and usi ng eq. (14 ):
12
￿ an d ￿
2
are de￿n ed i n the App en di x. T h ere it i s al so sho wn th at ￿> 0a n d￿
2
￿ 1 ￿ ￿> 0.
13
Thi s exac t l y th e opp o site o f the c api tal d il uti on e ￿ect that o c curs i n case of an in crease i n n.S e e e . g.
































] : (18 )
The par ameter ￿ i ndi cat e s the sh a re o ft he y oung i n t he c hange of tota l consu mpt i on. T hi s







, w h ere ￿
y
is the abso l ute rat e of risk a v ersi o no fa y oung













.A n a lo g ousl y , ￿
r
st and s for the ri sk a v ers io n o f
an o l d i ndi vid ual. The equations sho w that the l a rger t h e absol ute r ate o f risk a v ersi on o f
a generation rel at iv et ot h e ri s ka v ersion o f the ot he r g e nerat i on, the sma lle r i t s pa rt i n the
c hange of tot al consu m pt io n
14
.M oreo v er , it i ndi cates that t he p o si tiv em acro ec o no mi c e ￿ ect
on i ndi vi dual consumpti o n can b e domin a ted b y the dep ende ncy ratio e￿ect d ep e nden t upo n
the l ev el of consumption b yt h e old in t h e steady sta te.
The fact that i ndi vid ual consumpti o nm a y fall or ri se in the shor tr u n se ems i n li ne with
the resul ts of Cutler et al. (199 0) w h o conc lu de that de crea se s i n the rat eo fp o p ulati o n gro wth
ha v e theoret i cal ly a m bi g uo u s short -ru n e￿ects on i ndi vi dual consumpti o n. Thei r n umeri cal
exp erimen ts sho w that for some coun tries short-r un g ai ns but fo ro t h ers sh o rt-run dec r ea se s i n
i ndi vid ual consumption resul t i n the case of agin g . In part i cul ar, i f the a gi ng of the p opu lation
i s b egi nni ng to b e f e lt i mmedi a tel y (a si nt h e case of Japan) then t h e curren t gene r ations wi l l
be w o rse o￿ w hi le i f a gi ng i s l ess sev ere in the next t w o d ecades ( as e . g. in the U. S. ) short-run
consumpti on g ai ns can b e o bt ai ned. Ho w ev er, our a na l ysis qu a l i ￿es these resul ts as i t turns
out that wh et he r co n sumption rise s or fal ls hea vi ly dep end s on the siz e o f the P A YG-sc heme .
In part i cul ar, u s i ng eq. (16 ) the fol lo win g p r op o si tion c a n easil y b e deri v ed :
Pr op ositi on 1
A n u n exp e cte d onc e- an d -for-a l l d e cr e as ei n nin itia l l yd e cr e as es individua l c ons u mptio n i￿





The i n terpreta ti o no f t hi s pr op o si tion i s str ai g h tforw ard: in t h e case of a l a rge P A YG -s ystem
t h e in cr ea se in the co n sumption p ossib il i t i es d ue to the decrease in sa vi ngs of the y oung is n o t
su￿ci en tt o pro vi de the rel ativ el y larg er n um be r o f old w i th the sam e , rel at iv el y h igh l ev el o f
consumpti on as b efore the s hoc k.
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Noti ce th at th is i mpl i es th at i f th e fel i cit y functi on i s of the CRRA t yp e, i .e. the r e lati ve rate of risk av ersi on
i s constant, the ge nerati on with th e larg est l ev el of in di vid ual consu mpti on gets the l argest pa rt of the c ha nge




< 1 i s the stabl e ro ot of the l in eari zed system.8
The ￿rst t er m in thi s equation in dic a tes t h e e￿ect of a c ha ng e i n the capi t al -lab o rr atio. A t
ag i v en i n terest rat e an in crease i n the capital sto c k p er w ork er imp li es a n i ncrease of the




t h u s d ecreasing the nee d fo r redi st ri buti o n from y oung
to the o l d through ￿ . An i ncrease i n t h e capi t al -l a b or ratio also dec r ea ses the in terest r ate, th us
i ncreasin g the need for redi st ri buti o n . Thi s e￿ e ct is measured b y ￿ , whi c hi st he ( p ositi v el y







. The larger thi s el ast ic it y ,t he la r ger
the e￿ect of a c ha ng ei nt h e capi t al -lab o r rat i o on the i n t er e st rat e . The se cond term in equation
(1 9)r e presen ts the e￿ect o fa c ha ng ei nt otal consumpti o n on the ta x rat e. As a part ￿ of t otal
consumpti on go es to the old , more t ota l consumpti o nc e t er i s par i bu s i ncreases t he t ax ra te. I n
the thi r dt er mw e recogni ze the dep end ency-ratio e￿ect ag ai n. An i ncrease in t h e dep ende ncy
rat i o ceteris p a ri bus i ncreases the tax ra te. The t ota l e￿ect on the tax r ate that r es u lts i n the
case of an un exp e ct ed c hange i n the r ate of p opu lation gro wth i s am b iguous.
The s ho r t- r un e￿ ec ts of a n exp ec ted dec r ease i n n
Not i ce￿ r st that i n the case of an e x p ected onc e-and-for-all c hange at time t = z ( i. e. h
0
=






= :: ::: < 0 ) there is no dep ende ncy-rat io e ￿ e c ta tt i m e t =0 . A s a










are prop ortional to t he c hange i n
to tal consumpti o n. Mo reo v er, t h e capi ta l l ab or-ra t i od o e sn o t jump in the c a se o fa n exp ected





T h e e ￿ e c t o f a n e x p ec t e d future de creas ei nn on c
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So the in iti a l macro economi c e￿ect i s de t ermi ned b y the a n ti cip a ted dep end ency r atio e ￿ ec t s
and c a p ital thi c k eni ng e￿ects
1 6
. The di ￿erence b et w e en the d ep e nden cy-ra ti o e￿ ec t a n d the




ag ai n. The f ol lo win g prop ositi o n can easil y b e
deri v ed from eq. ( 20) :
Pr op ositi on 2
A na n ticip ate do n c e-and-for -al l de cr e ase in n initial ly de cr e ases in dividu al c on sump tion i￿
￿ ￿ ( 1 ￿ ￿
1
+ ￿ )s.
Com pa ri ng wi th Prop osi t i on 1 it is of i n t erest t oo b serv e that no qua lit ativ ed i ￿ er e nce exi st s
rega rd ing the short -r u n e￿ects. Ho w ev er, the di ￿ er e nce i n e￿ects is of a qu a n ti t ativ e nature
as can b e seen from the app earance of the para meter ￿ i n Prop osi t io n 2
17
. T hi s ( p ositi v e)
param et er can b e in terpreted as a me a sure for t h e sp ee d a t whi c hc hanges in c o ns u mption
and i n v est men t are t ransmi t ted to future p e r i o ds and vi ce v ersa. I n part i cul ar ,i f￿ has a l o w
v al ue a n ti cip a ted future sho c ks wi l l strongly a ￿ect cu r ren tv alue s and e xp ected and u nexp ected
sho c ks wi l l ha v e simi lar resu lts. I n gen era l, h o w ev er ,c o mp a red to Pro po s i tion 1, w it h a g iv en
le v el of sa vi ngs, hi gher taxes are n eeded to cause ind ivi dual consu m pt i on to fall i n resp onse t o
an exp ected decrease i n n .
16
The capi tal thi c k en in g e￿ ect i s rein f o rced b y th e u nstab le eig en v al ue, ho w ev er. T h is i s du e to the addi ti onal
decre ase in s a vi ngs tha t i s necess ary in o rder to decreas e th e c api tal - l ab or ratio i n an ti ci pati on of a f u ture
decre ase in p op ul atio n gro wth
17
The pa rameter ￿ i s de￿n ed i n the App en di x.9
It is i n teresting to note that Pro p ositi o n 2 quali ￿e s the resul ts from Cu t le r e t a l. o n ce mor e:
i t impl i es that ,c o n tra ry to an u nexp ected d ecrease, an exp ected f ut ur e dec r ea se in p opu lation
gro wth ma y cause to tal consump t io n t o fa l l in iti a lly . This i s du e to the o v er l appi ng-generations
str u cture of our mo del . If i ndi vi dual consumpti o n decreases d ue to the sho c kt h e generation
bo rn i n the p eri o d b efo re t h e sho c k rat i onall y an t ic ip a t e s a decrease i n pu bl ic p ensi on b ene￿ t s
d u et ot h e dep end ency-ratio e￿ect whe n old (i.e. i n the p eri o d of the sh o c k) and reacts t o
thi s b y i ncre a si ng sa vin g sw he n y oun g . T h i s w i l li nt u rn l ead t o a decrease in tr ansfers in the
p erio d b efore the sho c k and so on. E v en tual ly t hi s w i l l lead t oa n in crease i n sa vin g sa nd t h us
a decrease in t ota l consumpti o na tt =0 .W he t he r t hi s negat iv ee ￿ e ct on consump t i o ni sl a rge
enough to out w ei g h the p osi t iv ee ￿ ec t due to the a n ti cip a ted capi ta l thi c k eni ng e￿ect dep ends
on the si ze of the P A YG -sc he me aga in . S o , in co un t ri es where the agi ng of the p opul at io n w ill
n o t o c cur b efore t h e next cen tury but wh ere t he P A YG-syst em is r e lativ el y ext e nsiv ei t m i g h t
b en e c e ssa ry n ev er the less to cut i n i n terg e nera ti onal tra n sfers .
Usi ng the fact that the capi t al -lab o rr atio a nd t he de p en denc y rat i o do not c hange ini tial ly ,
the fol lo w i ng coroll ar y can b e deri v e d fro m e q. (19) and Pro po s i tion 2 :
Cor o ll ary 1
A na n ticip ate do n c e-and-for -al l de cr e ase in n in itial ly incr e ases the tax r ate i￿
￿ ￿ ( 1 ￿ ￿
1
+ ￿ )s.
Thi s c o roll ary h a sa ni n terestin g i mpl ication. It i m pl ie s t ha t in the absen ce of a P A YG-￿n a nc ed
pu bli c p e nsion system s uc h a system c a nc o me ab out in an tic ipation of a dec r ea se i n the ra te
of p o p ulati o n gro wth. T h is resul t is ra the r surprisi ng a si n tui tion sa ys that an in creasing
p o pu lation w oul d giv e more ro o m for t h e in st al lation of a publ i c p e nsion system due t o the l o w
ta x rates im pl ie d b y high r ates of p opul at i on gro wth. The p o in t is that an a￿ ue n t capital st oc k
a t t he t i me of the sho c ki sa n t i ci pated b yt h e forw ard-l o oking g o v er n men t whi c h i nci tes he r t o
i ncrease the tax rat e sim ul t ane o u sly l eadi ng to a decrease of the sa vin g sb ya l l generations l i ving
b efo re the sho c k. These desi n v estm en t sl e a d to an in crease i n t he co n sumption p ossi bil i t ie s f o r
old a nd y oung i ndi vid uals.
The long -run e￿e c ts of a dec r ea s ei nn
In the l ong ru n, t he c a p ital sto c k p er w ork er remai ns unc hanged as immedi at e ly can b e s ee n
fro m the mo di ￿ed g ol den rul e (eq.( 13) ). Moreo v er, t h e redi st ri buti o ne ￿ ec t so fa c hange i n the
dep end ency rat i o canc el out a nd d o not a￿ect tota lc o n sumption. So the onl y e￿ ec t on t otal
consumpti on p er w o rk er in t h e long run i s t he p ositi v ec a p ital thi c k en in g e￿ ec t .C onse quen tly ,









h>0 : (21 )
As in Cutl er e t al. t h e l ong-run e￿ect of a gi ng on i ndi vi dual consump t i o ni st h e sum of a p o si tiv e
capi t al t hi c k eni ng e￿ect and a ne g ativ e dep end ency- r atio e￿ect. In con tra st t o this pap er, w e
can easil y determin e t he ne t e￿ ect as i n our mo d el
18
t he r ei sa n e xpl ici t rel at io n be t w e en these
t w oe ￿ ects. It immed iately foll o ws t ha tt he c a p ital- t hi c k eni ng e ￿ ec t on i nd ivi dual c o ns u mption
out w ei ghs t he d ep e nden cy-ra ti o e ￿ ect i ￿ the part of t ota l consumpti o n p er w ork er c o n sumed




) i s small er than sa vi ngs p er w ork er .F rom eqs. (2), (7 )a nd ( 9) i t foll o ws
that thi s cond ition is e quiv alen tt o￿< ( n ￿ r ) k . Thi s l eads us to the foll o wi ng prop osi t i on:
18
Noti ce that l ife exp ectancy at the ti me of bi rt h is ￿ xed.1 0
Pr op ositi on 3
In a dynamic al ly e￿cien te c onomy ( r> n ) with a non-ne gative t ax r ate, a de c r e ase in n
de cr e ases in dividu al c on sum ption in the lon g run.
As i n the long run t h e capi ta l- la bo r r atio d o es not c hange, it can e a si l y b e deriv ed t ha t
the l o ng -run tax r ate is a negat iv ef u nction of t h e rate o fp o p ulation gro wth. C onse quen tly ,
the e￿ e ct of a decrease in p o pu la ti o n gro wth o n the long-run tra ns f er p a ymen t ￿ is p o si t iv ei f
￿ ￿ 0 .I f t he t a x rate i s p osi t iv e, ho w ev er, t he e￿ect o n the tra ns f er p a ymen ti sa m b iguous.
5 Concl udi ng R em a rks
In thi s pap er the e￿ects of agin g on P A YG-￿nance d p ubl ic p ensi o ns c he m e s and i ndi vid ual
consumpti on has b een analyz ed in an o v er l appi ng-generations g e neral-e quil i briu m fra mew ork.
The l o ng -r un e ￿ e cts of ag in g a re w el l-kn o wn. Thi s kn o wl edge is summariz ed in P rop o si tion 3 o f
thi s pap er. The sh o rt-run e ￿ ec t s, ho w ev er, are m uc h l ess kno wn i n the li t er ature. In part i cul ar,
Cutle r et al . (199 0) cl aim t h ese e￿ ec t st ob ea m bi guous, but, at the sa me time, suggest b y
n umeri cal sim ul at i ons that an u nexp ected decrease in the rate of p opul a ti o n gro wth wi ll h a v e
a negat i v e e￿ect on i ndi vi dual consumption, whi le if thi s de crea s e i s ex pe ct ed to o c cur aft er a
few de ca d es, shor t-run g ai ns i n consump t i o n w i l lb eo bt ai ned.
Thi s p a p er has d eriv ed the sh o rt-run e￿ ec t so f a g i ng anal yt i call y . The resu lts are re￿ ected
i n Pr op o si tions 1 a nd 2 . The se pro p ositi o n s cl aim that for unexp ected as w el l f o r exp ected
ag in g o f the p opu lation the size of t he P A YG-￿nance d publ i c p ensi on s c h eme is the determin ing
v ari a b le for the short-r un e ￿ e cts .I n p a rtic ul a r, for an extensi v e p ubl ic p ensi on sys tem b oth
t yp es o f sho c ks ma yl e a d to losses in i ndi vi dual consump t i on. On the ot he r ha n d, if the P A YG-
ta xe s are r e lativ el y smal l, ga i n si nc o ns u mption wil l b e enabl ed b y a decrease i n s a vi ngs .I n a n
O L G -m o d el the se g ai ns in consumption p os si bi l itie s are partly tra ns f er red t o the old through
an i ncrease in t he t ax rat e . So, it fo llo ws t ha ti fa P A YG -s c he m e is no n existen t, it can come
ab out b ecause of an e xp ected decrease in t he r a te o f p opul a ti on gr o wt h. W i t ha ne y et ur ne d
t o r ea lit y thi s imp li es that t h e abund a n t gro wth i n co v era ge and siz e of pub li c p ensi o ns c hemes
whi c h has b een manife s t in the W estern w orld the ￿rst t w o dec a de s after W orld W ar I I coul d
b e expl aine d fro m the a n ti ci pa ti on of t he a g i n go ft h e p opu lation to o ccu r i n the ￿rst d ecades
of the next cen tury whe n the bab y-b o o m generation ret i res. So t h e gro wth o f pub li c p en sion
sc hemes i n the face of a gi ng coul d ha v e b een a w el f are-maxi m iz in g po li cy a cc o rdi ng to our
mo del . Rece n t measures t ak en i n t he W est er nw or l d aime d a tr es t ri cting the gr o wt h rate o f
the ta xe s co u ld the n b e e xpl a i ned from t he f a c t that d emo graphi c c hanges app e a rt o b em uc h
mor ed r amat i c than exp e ct e d. In part i cul ar, giv en the then e xistin g exten s iv eP A YG-sc heme ,
the sharp decrease i n bi rt h rates that st art e d in the se v en t ie s i n t he EC-c o un t ri es ma de a drop
i n b ene￿t rat e s una v oi dabl e.
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App endi x
Com pa r at iv e dynam ics
The m e t h o d of compara ti v e dynamic s w orks as foll o ws. L et h
t
de scrib e the t i me p a ttern of the
p ert urb a ti o no f the steady-stat ev a l u eo ft h e para meter n a nd ￿ the mag n itud e. So n
t
= n + ￿ h
t
.
The e ￿ ec t so fam a rgi nal c ha nge in n can then b e t raced b yd i ￿ eren ti a ti o no f the ￿rst -order e qs.
(4 )a n d (12) and t h e resource constra in t (8) with resp ec t to ￿ . Th is yie lds the f ol lo win g l ine a r






(to tal c o ns u mption

























; t =0 ; 1 ;: : :: (i)
where M i s a matrix de scribi ng the e￿ects o f the c urr en t and next-p e r iod c hange i n the exoge-





































k ( 1+r )(1 + n)(1 ￿ ￿)







. T h e para meter ￿
y
sta nd s f o r the absol ute ra te











. Anal o gousl y , ￿
r
in dic a tes
the ri sk a v ersi o no fa n o l d i ndi vi dual .
Thi s sys tem compriz es one p r e determine d v ariabl e ( k ) and one fo rw a rd -lo oki ng v ar i abl e (c).

































A s easi ly can b e c he c k ed, o ne o f these ei gen v al ues li es i nsid e whil e the ot he r lie s o ut si de the
un it ci rcle . So t h e system i s sa d dle p oin t stabl e and c a nb es o lv ed to ￿nd the i ni t ia l e ￿ ec t o f






























































( i;j =1 ; 2) denote el emen ts o f J and M . The ev ol ut i o no fb o t hk and c can
then b ed e r iv ed from the sys tem equ a ti o n s. Giv en the ev ol ution of to tal c o n sumption w e can
cal cul a te the t im e pa ths of consu m pt io n b y the y oun g o r the o l d u sin g the de￿n iti o no f c . The
e￿ect on the p ensi on system t h en fol lo w s.














































T h e ￿ r s t t e r m o n the ri g h t hand si de of t h is equ a ti o n d escrib es the i ni t i al e￿ect on t otal
consumpti on of an exp e cted c ha ng e i n p opul a ti o n gro wth whi l e the second term i ndi cat e s the
addi tional e￿ e ct in case of an un exp e ct e d de creas ei n n( h
0
< 0 ). The latter e￿ e ct is, o fc o ur se ,
po si t iv e
2 0





= ￿￿￿ = h<0.
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> 0 it immed ia t e ly foll o ws
from f o otnote (19 ) th at ￿ +1￿ ￿
2
< 0